Part II: Dissecting the Florida Business Brokers Contract - The Buyer Trap Exposed
- Evan Howard
- Oct 8
- 13 min read
Important Legal Disclaimer: This article is for general educational purposes only and is not legal advice. It reflects perspectives from experienced North Carolina business attorneys and M&A advisors at Howard Law regarding common risks and best practices in Florida business transfers. This is not a Florida legal opinion. Florida law questions should be directed to a Florida-licensed attorney. Reading or relying on this article does not create an attorney-client relationship with Howard Law.
When "Standard" Forms Become Buyer Traps
In Part I of this series, we examined how Florida business brokers routinely violate unauthorized practice of law statutes. Now we turn to the weapon of choice they use to commit these violations: the Business Brokers of Florida standard Asset Purchase Contract and Receipt; a bit over dramatic but depending on the broker utilizing the document could be spot on. This 21-page document, complete with its sinister copyright disclaimer on every page, represents one of the most systematically buyer-unfavorable contracts we've encountered in decades of business transaction practice.
Spoiler Alert: We would never allow a client to execute the following agreement and if required by the broker, we would attempt to identify a similar business for sale with another broker.
Business Brokers of Florida Form Asset Purchase Agreement:
At Howard Law, we recently received a completed version of this form from a broker (the attached document has been redacted for privacy). What we discovered was shocking: a contract so heavily tilted toward sellers and brokers that it would make a seasoned attorney cringe. The document we received was filled out by the broker before our client had conducted any due diligence, had any bank review the deal, or even executed a letter of intent. This practice alone should terrify any potential buyer.
The most telling aspect of this form appears at the bottom of every single page: "In no event will Business Brokers of Florida be liable for any loss or damage, including without limitation indirect or consequential loss or damage, or any loss or damage whatsoever arising from, out of, or in connection with the use of this form." This blanket indemnity should be an immediate red flag. Why would a trade organization need to completely disclaim liability for a "standard" contract form unless they knew it contained problematic provisions that could harm users?
The Copyright Disclaimer: A Red Flag You Can't Ignore
Before diving into the contract's specific provisions, we need to address the elephant in the room. Every single page of this BBF form contains the disclaimer absolving Business Brokers of Florida of any liability for losses arising from use of their form. This isn't standard practice in legitimate legal forms. Professional legal organizations typically stand behind their work product, but here we see a trade organization explicitly disclaiming responsibility for any harm their form might cause.
This disclaimer suggests that BBF knows their form contains provisions that could harm users, yet they continue to distribute it while protecting themselves from liability. It's similar to a car manufacturer putting a sticker on every vehicle saying "we're not responsible if this car hurts you" - it immediately raises questions about the product's safety and the manufacturer's confidence in it.
The completed document we received demonstrates another concerning practice: the broker filled out this complex legal document before our client had completed any meaningful due diligence or financial review. This represents exactly the kind of unauthorized legal document preparation that violates Florida's UPL statutes, as discussed in Part I.
The Earnest Money Trap: Inappropriate for Main Street Businesses
The very first section of the BBF form reveals its bias against buyers through its earnest money requirements. Our example showed an additional deposit required "upon acceptance of offer by Seller," separate from any initial earnest money deposit. This means buyers must put those funds at risk immediately upon contract execution, before conducting meaningful due diligence.
This practice flies in the face of normal Main Street business transaction customs. Unlike real estate deals where earnest money deposits serve to demonstrate buyer commitment for standardized, high-value assets, small businesses are unique assets with limited marketability. The complexity of business operations, financial verification, and operational transfer makes such large upfront deposits inappropriate and unnecessary.
The deposit structure becomes even more problematic when combined with the contract's default provisions. Section 9.1.2 gives sellers the option to "retain the Deposits as liquidated damages" if buyers fail to close or perform any contract covenants. This means the seller can keep your initial earnest money deposit even if their actual damages from your withdrawal are minimal or nonexistent.
Consider the practical impact: a buyer discovers during due diligence that the seller has undisclosed tax liabilities, regulatory violations, or other material problems. If this discovery occurs after the due diligence period expires (which we'll discuss is unreasonably short), the buyer faces losing all of that escrow deposit to avoid completing a problematic purchase. This creates economic pressure to proceed with bad deals rather than lose substantial deposits.
The Due Diligence Time Crunch: Setting Buyers Up for Failure
Section 8 of the BBF form creates a due diligence framework that appears protective but actually disadvantages buyers through compressed timelines and seller-controlled information flow. The due diligence period in our example ran just 28 days, is inadequate for comprehensive business analysis including financial record review, operational assessment, equipment evaluation, lease analysis, and contractual relationship examination; especially when combined with the remaining clauses read together.
The timeline problem compounds when we examine Section 8.4, which gives sellers 10 business days to provide requested documents. In a 28-day period with weekends, buyers have approximately 20 business days available. If sellers use their full 10-day window to provide critical information, buyers have only 10 business days remaining for analysis and decision-making. This rushed timeline makes thorough evaluation nearly impossible.
Section 8.5 requires buyers to provide written notice during the due diligence period if they're not satisfied "to the sole, complete, and personal satisfaction of Buyer." While this sounds protective, the subjective satisfaction standard creates problems. Once the due diligence period expires, buyers lose all protection regardless of what problems they subsequently discover.
The apparent buyer protection in Section 8.6 allows escrow agents to refund deposits without seller authorization if cancellation occurs during due diligence. However, this protection becomes meaningless once the compressed due diligence period expires, leaving buyers exposed to losing deposits for problems they couldn't reasonably discover in the limited timeframe provided.
Section 6.9: The Seller's Acknowledgment That Transfers All Risk to Sellers
One of the most problematic provisions in the entire contract appears in Section 6.9, titled "Seller's Acknowledgment." This section requires sellers to acknowledge that "Broker made no representations concerning the creditworthiness, integrity, or ability of Buyer to complete this transaction" and that "Seller has relied solely on Buyer's representations with respect thereto."
This provision is deeply problematic because brokers routinely do vet buyers and often require personal financial statements before providing access to business information. We've had brokers demand extensive financial documentation before even allowing NDA execution, yet this contract provision allows them to disclaim all responsibility for buyer qualification while simultaneously claiming they've "earned compensation."
Note: the broker that filled out our example redacted BBF form required our client to provide a thorough and complete personal financial statement just to review the Confidential Information Memorandum - so this clause in our example was a complete fraud.
The section continues by stating that "Broker has performed all Broker's duties pursuant to the listing agreement and has earned its compensation as set forth therein." This creates situations where sellers bear all buyer credit risk while guaranteeing broker payment regardless of whether the buyer can actually complete the transaction.
Most egregiously, Section 6.9 includes blanket indemnification language requiring sellers to hold brokers "harmless from and against any and all claims and damages of any kind relating to this subject transaction, except for its intentionally wrongful or grossly negligent acts." This means sellers must protect brokers from liability for everything except the most extreme misconduct.
The Default Provisions: Seller Liquidated Damages vs. Limited Buyer Remedies
Section 9 demonstrates the largest bias in the entire contract through its asymmetric default remedies. When buyers default, Section 9.1.2 gives sellers the simple option to "retain the Deposits as liquidated damages." No proof of actual damages required, no relationship between the deposit amount and actual harm suffered - sellers just keeps the money.
Florida law generally requires liquidated damages to bear reasonable relationship to actual anticipated damages, but challenging these provisions requires expensive litigation that most buyers cannot afford. The practical effect is that sellers can retain substantial deposits regardless of whether they suffered any real harm from buyer default.
The remedies available to buyers under Section 9.2 are far more limited and expensive to pursue. If sellers "willfully default[s]," buyers can either terminate and seek reimbursement for costs incurred, or pursue specific performance through litigation. Both options require buyers to prove seller misconduct while their deposits remain tied up in escrow.
The specific performance option requires buyers to file lawsuits and prove their cases in court with no guarantee of success and no immediate access to deposit funds. This creates situations where buyers must spend thousands in legal fees to pursue deals where sellers are clearly in default, making the supposed "remedy" practically worthless for most transactions.
The Impossible Closing Date: No Bank Review, No Real Due Diligence
Section 3 establishes closing dates without regard for practical realities of business financing and due diligence. Our example provided a closing date, with the contract marked as "NOT CONTINGENT upon any third party financing." This means buyers must complete purchases regardless of their ability to obtain financing.
Note: Broker was made aware our client was obtaining an SBA loan for the purchase of this business and still attempted to slip this one in.
This approach ignores the reality that most business acquisitions require financing, and that SBA and conventional lenders need substantial time for underwriting, appraisals, and due diligence. Setting firm closing dates before lenders have reviewed deals creates impossible timelines that favor sellers who can claim buyer default when financing delays occur.
Even more problematic is the expectation that buyers execute binding purchase agreements before conducting meaningful due diligence or having lenders review the opportunity. This reverses normal transaction sequencing where buyers would first execute letters of intent, complete due diligence, secure financing commitments, and only then proceed to binding purchase agreements.
The combination of compressed due diligence periods and inflexible closing dates creates a perfect storm where buyers face losing substantial deposits if they can't complete impossible timelines, while sellers face no corresponding obligations to maintain business operations or cooperate with buyer financing requirements.
The Indemnification Imbalance: Inadequate Buyer Protection
Section 18 contains indemnification provisions that appear protective but provide inadequate practical protection for buyers. While Section 18.1 requires sellers to indemnify buyers from pre-closing liabilities, the implementation through Sections 18.2.1 and 18.2.2 creates significant limitations.
The post-closing escrow amount specified in Section 18.2.2 is laughably inadequate for most business transactions; at least in the document we were provided and filled out by the broker. The amount required in our example might have covered minor warranty claims, but failed to provide any meaningful protection against substantial liabilities like employment law violations, environmental issues, tax problems, or contract disputes that could cost far more to resolve.
The 30-day post-closing claim period is equally problematic. Many business problems take months to surface - employee lawsuits, regulatory investigations, customer disputes, or vendor claims often don't become apparent until well after closing. A 30-day discovery window provides no real protection for buyers who may face substantial liabilities that couldn't reasonably be discovered in such a short timeframe.
Section 18.2.3 attempts to address these limitations by stating that escrow amounts "shall not limit the liability of Seller to Buyer." However, this theoretical unlimited liability becomes meaningless if sellers lack assets to satisfy claims or if pursuing larger indemnification claims costs more than potential recovery amounts.
Section 13: The Modification Trap
Section 13 addresses promissory notes and security agreements in a way that sounds standard but contains problematic blanket language. The section states that it applies "In the event that the Agreement calls for a Promissory Note to Seller" without providing any ability to modify or negotiate the security agreement terms.
This creates situations where buyers must accept whatever security agreement terms the form provides, regardless of whether those terms are appropriate for their specific circumstances. The blanket approach prevents customization that might be necessary for different business types, asset structures, or buyer situations.
The security agreement provisions in Section 13.5 are particularly broad, requiring collateral to include "The Business and the Business Assets, and any additions, substitutions, and replacements thereto" plus "any other tangible or intangible assets owned and/or utilized by Buyer in the operation of the Business." This sweeping language could encompass assets buyers never intended to pledge as collateral.
Section 32: The Closing Attorney Selection Problem
Section 32 demonstrates another area where brokers exceed their authority by designating specific closing attorneys. In our example, the broker selected a law firm as both the escrow agent and the transaction closing attorneys. This dual role creates conflicts where the same firm handling deposits also represents the transaction generally.
The practical problem is that when banks are involved in financing, they typically choose their own closing attorneys or have specific requirements for legal counsel. Brokers selecting closing attorneys before buyers have secured financing creates conflicts and additional complications that can delay closings or increase costs.
Section 32.1 acknowledges that the closing attorney "is not representing the individual legal interests of the Parties" while requiring both parties to split attorney fees. This shared representation creates the conflicts we discussed in Part I, where neither party receives adequate legal protection while both pay for compromised representation.
The provision encourages parties to "secure their own legal representation," but most buyers never do because they've already committed to splitting fees for the "transaction attorney." This discourages the independent representation that buyers desperately need to identify and negotiate improvements to the contract's buyer-unfavorable provisions.
Section 35: Forced Florida Law and Venue
Section 35 establishes Florida law and venue requirements that significantly disadvantage out-of-state buyers who must travel to Florida for any legal proceedings and navigate unfamiliar court systems. Our example requires all disputes to be resolved in Florida, which may be hundreds or thousands of miles from the buyer's home base, and is some instances from where the seller lives if they are running their Florida business remotely.
This forced venue selection creates substantial practical barriers to enforcing buyer rights or challenging seller breaches. An out-of-state buyer facing a significant escrow deposit dispute must hire Florida counsel, travel to Florida for proceedings, and navigate local legal practices - costs that may exceed the amount in dispute.
Florida's approach to business transaction disputes, restrictive covenant enforcement, and indemnification may differ significantly from buyer expectations based on their home state laws. These differences can create unexpected exposures or limit available remedies that sophisticated legal counsel would identify through appropriate contract analysis.
The combination of forced Florida venue and attorney fee provisions in Section 36 makes dispute resolution expensive and impractical for many out-of-state buyers, effectively insulating sellers from accountability for contract breaches or misrepresentations.
Sections 56 and 57: Broker-Added Legal Modifications
Our example contained two additional clauses numbered 56 and 57 (redacted) that were added by the broker, demonstrating exactly the kind of unauthorized legal document modification that violates Florida's UPL statutes. Section 56 modifies the seller training provisions, while Section 57 adds business disclosures about pending workers' compensation claims.
These broker-added provisions represent unauthorized practice of law under Florida precedent discussed in Part I. When brokers add, modify, or customize legal provisions based on specific circumstances, they cross the line from ministerial form completion into legal document preparation requiring attorney expertise.
The fact that brokers routinely add custom provisions demonstrates their awareness that the form requires modification for specific transactions, yet they perform these modifications themselves rather than directing parties to qualified legal counsel. This practice exposes both brokers and their clients to legal risks while potentially invalidating or complicating the modifications themselves.
Schedule B: The NDA Trap Within the Contract
The BBF contract requires buyers to execute the attached "Standard Non-Disclosure Agreement" as Schedule B, but this NDA contains provisions that are far from standard and heavily favor brokers and sellers. Most concerning is the "Procuring Cause" provision that requires buyers to pay full broker compensation if they complete any transaction with the seller within two years, even without broker involvement.
The NDA also contains broad indemnification language requiring buyers to hold brokers harmless from claims or damages, forum selection requiring Florida venue for disputes, and attorney fee provisions favoring brokers. These terms go far beyond normal confidentiality requirements and create substantial additional buyer obligations.
Perhaps most problematic is that buyers must agree to these NDA terms before seeing the seller's actual agreement with the broker. This prevents buyers from understanding exactly what broker compensation arrangements they're agreeing to protect, potentially exposing them to obligations they never intended to assume.
The Pattern of Systematic Buyer Disadvantage
Examining the BBF form as a whole reveals a clear pattern of provisions designed to favor sellers and protect brokers while shifting maximum risk to buyers. Every major section contains language that either limits buyer protections, expands buyer obligations, or creates economic barriers to buyer remedies.
This systematic bias reflects the reality that these forms are created by and for the brokerage industry, not for buyer protection. The combination of unrealistic timelines, inadequate deposit protections, limited remedy provisions, forced venue selection, and broad indemnification requirements creates a transaction framework heavily tilted against buyer interests.
Understanding this bias is crucial for buyers who must either negotiate substantial modifications to level the playing field or walk away from deals that contain unacceptable risks. The money invested in qualified legal counsel to identify and address these problems is almost always a fraction of what buyers save through better contract terms and avoided disputes.
Why Buyers Should Avoid Executing the BBF Asset Purchase Agreement
The heavily slanted buyer disadvantages built into the BBF form make it unsuitable for any serious business acquisition where buyers want to protect their interests and investments. At Howard Law, we strongly advise buyers to refuse execution of this document in its standard form and instead demand properly drafted, attorney-prepared purchase agreements that provide appropriate buyer protections. The BBF contract is designed by and for brokers and sellers, not buyers, with every major provision favoring sellers, protecting the broker and creating economic traps for purchasers.
Most critically, brokers who present this form for execution are most likely engaging in unauthorized practice of law under Florida statutes. When they explain provisions, recommend modifications, or guide buyers through completion, they commit criminal violations that should disqualify them from transaction involvement. The proper approach is to insist on attorney-drafted letters of intent followed by comprehensive purchase agreements prepared by qualified legal counsel rather than executing documents created by those legally prohibited from practicing law.
Any broker who insists on using the BBF form or discourages attorney involvement is essentially telling you their interests matter more than yours. The cost of proper legal representation is a fraction of the potential losses from executing disadvantageous contracts that systematically favor sellers while creating substantial risks for buyers. Don't let broker pressure or false claims about "standard" forms cost you thousands of dollars in your business acquisition.
Caveat Emptor in Florida Business Acquisitions
The BBF Asset Purchase Contract represents a masterclass in one-sided contract drafting designed to protect everyone except the buyers who will bear the greatest financial risk in these transactions. From inappropriate earnest money requirements to compressed due diligence periods, from inadequate indemnification protection to forced venue selection, every major provision favors sellers while limiting buyer protections.
The document we received, completed by a broker before any due diligence or financial review, demonstrates the dangerous intersection of unauthorized practice of law violations and systematically unfair contract terms. Buyers who sign these agreements without independent legal counsel do so at their own peril.
We have seen too many buyers discover these problems after signing, when their leverage to negotiate improvements has disappeared. The time to protect yourself is before making any deposits or signing any agreements, not after problems develop.
Remember that brokers cannot legally explain these contract provisions or modify terms - that's unauthorized practice of law. Only qualified attorneys can provide the legal analysis and advocacy you need to level the playing field in Florida business acquisitions.
Howard Law is a North Carolina business law and M&A advisory firm providing experienced guidance to buyers and sellers navigating complex business transactions nationwide. We specialize in protecting client interests while ensuring compliance with applicable legal requirements. Contact us at www.ehowardlaw.com for consultation on your business acquisition needs.
Coming Next: In Part III of this series, we'll examine specific negotiation strategies for improving BBF contract terms, including language modifications that provide better buyer protection and reduce the risks identified in this analysis.



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